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My assignment, as I understood it when Professor Landsman in-
vited me to speak at this Symposium, was to address the question of
whether judges continue to make law in the products liability field.
This seemed a sufficiently broad topic, and I assumed, like Mark
Twain in his recounting of the early days of his education to become a
riverboat pilot in Life on the Mississippi,' that this would all be pleas-
ant enough work.
To begin my efforts, inquiring into the meaning of "law" seemed an
appropriate start. That was the point at which I began to identify with
Twain a bit later in his student pilot training. This occurred when, one
night at midnight, a watchman awoke him and told him he was ex-
pected to be in the pilot-house ready to work in something less than
sixty seconds. Twain wrote that getting up in the middle of the night
to go to work "was a detail in piloting that never occurred to me at all.
I knew that boats ran all night, but somehow I had never happened to
reflect that somebody had to get up out of a warm bed to run them."'2
Defining "law" turns out to be only slightly less daunting than being
awakened from a sound sleep in the middle of the night to learn to
pilot a riverboat down the Mississippi. What I discovered is that this
question is one that philosophers and lawyers have been debating for
centuries, with no movement toward consensus. A 1974 text on legal
process identifies eighteen different answers to the question, "What is
Law?". 3 Had I found A.E. Hoebel's remarks about this business of
defining law before I began, I suspect that I, like Twain, might have
had second thoughts about whether to embark on this journey: "To
seek a definition of law is to set forth upon a quest for the Holy Grail.
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa. The author thanks Joe Lotus for his assistance in
researching and preparing this article.
1. MARK TWAIN, LIFE ON Ta Mississippi 28-29 (Bantam 1985) (1896).
2. Id. at 29-30.
3. See STEPHEN D. FORD, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 2-4 (2d ed. 1974); see also STEVEN
J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 1 (2d ed. 1995) ("Philosophers
have debated the question [of what is law] for centuries.").
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Anyone who has made this search will readily sympathize with the
lament of Max Radin, 'Those of us who have learned humility have
given over the attempt to define law." 4
Deciding that if I had to be up in the middle of the night attempting
figuratively to steer a riverboat down the Mississippi, I might as well
engage the endeavor a bit, I explored these different meanings and
came to the conclusion-prompted by H.L.A. Hart 5-that the differ-
ent definitions are meant to do different duties for different people
with different purposes in mind. Some are concerned with the author-
ity for law-distinguishing law from fiat backed by force-others are
concerned with constitutional law and the political theory justifying
courts having the last say. Others recognize that we need the law not
only to address primary behavior but also to provide the means by
which disputes are resolved, and still others are concerned with the
prohibitory nature of criminal law and its impact on freedom.6
So, understanding the inquiry about judges making law to be about
the resolution of cases in which one party claims that she should ob-
tain compensation for an injury from another, I will, somewhat arbi-
trarily, utilize an understanding of law as the collection of precedents,
rules, principles, and policies that are employed in products liability
cases to determine whether the defendant will compensate the
plaintiff.7
But do judges "make" law? Once again, that requires an interpre-
tive turn: what do we mean by "make?" I sense that often when the
accusation "judicial activist making law" is hurled about, there is a
normative assumption that "making" law is not an appropriate judicial
function. Let me dip my toe briefly in the normative question of
whether judges should "make law" (I will return to that question
later) by paraphrasing my colleague Arthur Bonfield, who, when I ex-
plained to him my task at this conference, observed that "U]udicial
activism occurs when a judge employs a new legal principle I don't
like." A corollary to Professor Bonfield's dictum is what judicial ac-
tivism is not: "When a judge employs a new legal principle I like."
4. See EDWARD ADAMSON HOEBEL, MAN IN THE PRIMITIVE WORLD 359 (1949).
5. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 1-3 (1961).
6. I think a fair reading of H.L.A. Hart is that a serious answer to the question of what is law
requires further specification: for what reason do we want to know what the law is? See id.; see
also Roscoe Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7 TUL. L. REV.
475, 475-76 (1933).
7. This definition is an amalgamation drawn from my colleague, Steve Burton, and an obser-
vation by Karl Llewellyn. See BURTON, supra note 3, at 7; KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE
BUSH 3 (1985) ("What these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself.").
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Aside from revealing hypocrisy in those criticizing judicial activism,
Bonfield's observations also provide the beginning of understanding
what we mean when we inquire about judges' "making law." Making
law, I take it, is when a judge employs a new principle to decide a
case.8 The perjorative "making law" is more often employed with re-
gard to a new rule that sweeps broadly and therefore affects many
future cases than when the court adopts a new rule that is more nar-
rowly confined to the facts in the case. The latter is, after all, the
traditional conception of the common law process, and Karl Llewellyn
long ago cautioned that, as a prudential matter, judges should be at-
tuned to confining their declarations of new principles.9
What about judges making products liability law? Of course they
"make law." They always have, and will continue to do so as long as
we ask courts to resolve disputes over accidents that reflect contempo-
rary social and economic activity and the continuing march of techno-
logical change. Tort law has been, until recent decades, exclusively
judge-made law.10 Justice Shaw, who in the infancy of tort law in the
United States, announced that negligence was to be the basis of liabil-
ity,11 "made" law every bit as much as Justice Traynor, who in 1963,
announced the new law of strict products liability. 12 All of the law
contained in the first American treatise on tort law and all of the law
contained in the first torts casebook was judge-made law.13
8. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 7, at 40-41 ("When [the court] speaks to the question before it,
it announces law, and if what it announces is new, it legislates, it makes the law.").
9. See id. at 41.
10. See Robert L. Rabin, Federalism and the Tort System, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 2 (1997)
("Tort law in America is built on the bedrock of state common law.").
11. See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (Mass. 1850). Tort emerged as a separate
category of law in the latter half of the nineteenth century. See G. Edward White, The Intellec-
tual Origins of Torts in America, 86 YALE L.J. 671, 678-83 (1977).
12. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900-02 (Cal. 1963). The approval
the following year of a strict products liability standard by the American Law Institute in § 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts contributed to the widespread adoption of strict products
liability by state courts. This was accompanied by a substantial liberalization of other aspects of
liability rules that enhanced the ability of injured plaintiffs to recover from those in the chain of
distribution. See, e.g., Michael D. Green, Successor Liability: The Superiority of Statutory Re-
form to Protect Products Liability Claimants, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 17, 24-26 (1986) (describing
the early expansion of traditional bases of successor liability for long-tail product liability claim-
ants); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liabil-
ity: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 483 & nn.12-13 (1990)
(abrogation of the patent-danger rule and permitting bystanders to employ strict products liabil-
ity); Barry A. Levansan & Daryl J. Lapp, Plaintiffs Burden of Proving Enhanced Injury in
Crashworthiness Cases: A Clash Worthy of Analysis, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 55 (1988) (explaining
widespread adoption of a duty upon the manufacturers to make automobiles and other products
reasonably safe in the event of an accident).
13. The treatise is FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS (1859). The textbook is JAMES
BARR AMES, SELECr CASES ON TORTS (1874).
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But my charge is to address the question of whether judges continue
to make products liability law today. This assignment recognizes the
role of the common law in developing strict products liability since the
early 1960s, a revolution that George Priest claims is "among the most
dramatic ever witnessed in the Anglo-American legal system," and
which he asserts compares in magnitude to the development of legal
realism and the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education14
decision. 15
There are at least three routes that I believe might be taken to ad-
dress different pieces of the question of whether judges continue to
make products liability law. One might be to look to the roll-back in
products liability that has occurred over the past fifteen years or so. 16
During this roll-back, courts have moved away from the consumer ex-
pectations test for design defects, employed a risk-benefit standard in
its place, essentially turning design defect law into a negligence stan-
dard, declined to impute knowledge of dangers that reasonably could
not have been known by the manufacturer at the time of the manufac-
ture and sale, limited the availability of market share theories of liabil-
ity to DES cases,17 reinvigorated the bulk supplier defense, adopted
comparative fault as a defense in strict liability, adopted a government
contractor defense, 18 insulated prescription drugs from design defect
claims, and snuffed out the trend toward recognizing a more liberal
rule of successor liability for long-tail plaintiff claims.' 9 I chose not to
pursue this route for two reasons. First, I want to avoid quibbling
about whether rolling back something that is the result of judges'
"making law" is itself "making law." One might take the position that
the roll-back is merely correcting prior judicial lawmaking activity and
returning to the status quo. My second reason is stronger: cataloguing
and documenting these changes has already been performed by
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1953).
15. George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellec-
tual Foundations of the Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 461 (1985). Although Priest
credits academics for the intellectual roots of this movement, in the end it was judges like Roger
Traynor who wrote prosletyzing opinions and other judges who adopted this new rule of strict
products liability.
16. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-makers: Recent California Experience
with "New" Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 455 (1999).
17. See Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 561 A.2d 511, 522-28 (N.J. 1989); Jackson v. Glidden Co., 647
N.E.2d 879, 884 (Ohio 1995).
18. See Boyle v. United Tech., Inc., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).
19. See Michael D. Green, Successors and CERCLA: The Imperfect Analogy to Products Lia-
bility and an Alternative Proposal, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 897, 909 (1993). But see Richard L. Cupp
Jr., Redesigning Successor Liability, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 845 (noting recent decisions favoring
successor liability and claiming that courts' interest in "tinkering" with the rule has intensified).
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Professors Henderson and Eisenberg.20 The revolution that they ex-
plain is no longer a "quiet revolution" to those aware of their work or
who follow products liability developments.
A second possibility would be to look at some of the major social
engineering tort cases in recent years, including the state attorneys
general's suits in tobacco and the burgeoning claims against gun man-
ufacturers. 21 These efforts have generated significant controversy and
concomitant barbs about the inappropriateness of courts' making so-
cial policy. 22 I eschewed this topic, because we are too early in these
efforts to make very much of them. The attorneys general's tobacco
suits were, after all, settled. Furthermore, the preliminary judicial de-
cisions in those cases ranged across a substantial spectrum that in-
cluded decisions quite unsympathetic to the effort and unwilling to
break any new ground, to one in Florida, which merely gave effect to
applicable legislation, to decisions that, while not pathbreaking, ena-
20. See Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 488-516.
Although it is difficult to pinpoint precisely, sometime in the early to mid-1980s courts
began to publish decisions that, taken in the aggregate, clearly signal a significant
change in the direction of judicial lawmaking in products liability .... First, several
cases are outright retreats from prior pro-plaintiff stances. Courts effectively are taking
away what they previously have given or, in matter of first impression within a jurisdic-
tion, are refusing to follow the lead of other courts that had earlier adopted a pro-
plaintiff rule. Second, in an area that developed for plaintiffs as rapidly as did products
liability, refusals to extend doctrine are almost as significant as withdrawals from earlier
holdings....
Id. at 488-89. See also Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of
Modem American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 699-702 (1992) (concluding that the aggressive
development of tort law between the 1960s and 1980s ceased in the 1990s).
21. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting partial sum-
mary judgment in favor of defendant gun manufacturers in suit by family members of gun-shot
victims alleging negligence and design defect); David Kairys, Legal Claims of Cities Against the
Manufacturers of Handguns, 71 TEMP. L. REv. 1 (1998) (advocating tort suits against handgun
manufacturers and cataloguing potential claims that might be asserted); Karen E. Meade, Break-
ing Through the Tobacco Industry's Smoke Screen: State Lawsuits for Reimbursement of Medical
Expenses, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 113 (1996) (describing state attorneys general's suits against the
tobacco industry to recover for medical expenses paid for state residents); see also Raymond E.
Gangarosa et al., Suits by Public Hospitals to Recover Expenditures for the Treatment of Disease,
Injury and Disability Caused by Tobacco and Alcohol, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 81 (1994).
22. See When Lawsuits Make Policy, ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 1998, at 17 ("Yet using the courts
to bully industries in this way is an abuse of the legal process and an evasion of democratic
accountability .... If legal extortion comes to replace the democratic process, everyone will
suffer .... A legal system which, despite its occasional excesses, enjoys the support of most
Americans will be brought into disrepute."); John Herzfeld, Jury in Brooklyn Finds Gun Makers
Negligent, Awards $520,000 in Damages to One Victim, 27 BNA PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP.
170, 171 (1999) (characterizing verdict against gun manufacturer as "[slocial engineering taking
place in a courtroom"); Uncle Sam v Big Tobacco: A Lawsuit that Runs Against Democracy
Itself, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 1999, at 22 (characterizing United States' suit against the tobacco
industry for recovery of health care costs as "the crowning disgrace of Janet Reno and the Justice
Department").
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bled the attorney general's suit to proceed to trial. The gun cases are
still at a very preliminary stage-too soon, I think, to evaluate the
courts' responses.
The third possibility, and the one that I chose to pursue, is to de-
scribe a body of lawmaking that has occurred in the area of mass toxic
substances litigation. I chose this topic because the lawmaking has
been manifest in several different forms, although all to similar effect.
Some of this lawmaking has been quite prominent-the Supreme
Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,23
was preceded by enormous interest and anticipation. The Court's
opinion has created a well-recognized revolution in the treatment of
expert witnesses and the admissibility of their testimony. By contrast,
few are aware of, or appreciate, the more subtle lawmaking that oc-
curred in this area beginning in the mid-1980s.
We might date the emergence of the mass toxic substances litigation
era to Judge Wisdom's seminal opinion in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp.2 4 Mass torts since then include the Dalkon Shield,
DES, Agent Orange, Bendectin, silicone gel breast implants, and, just
when we thought that the mass tort business was about to peter out,
fen-Phen arrived to enhance our field of inquiry, if not to provide
healthier bodies. Arguably, Judge Wisdom "made" law in Borel when
he affirmed the first jury verdict on behalf of an asbestos victim.2 5 On
calmer reflection, what one sees in Borel is the application of tradi-
tional tort principles in a different context, although the adoption of
an informed consent standard for determining the adequacy of a
warning was seminal.26 In addition, permitting the jury to find that
any exposure to a defendant's asbestos over multiple decades of expo-
sure was a cause of the plaintiff's asbestotic disease was essential both
to Mr. Borel's ability to succeed in his suit against multiple suppliers
of asbestos products to which he had been exposed and to the legions
of future asbestos victims who were exposed to multiple asbestos
products from various manufacturers over different periods of time.27
What I want to explore though is the converse, not the opening of
the courts to mass tort claims, but another of the responses by the
23. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 586-89 (1993).
24. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). Mention should be made of the litigation over the anti-
cholesterol drug, MER/29, which caused a variety of adverse effects, the most serious of which
were cataracts. MER/29 is responsible for a substantial number of personal injury suits in the
early 1960s. See Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disas-
ter Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REV. 116, 120-58 (1968).
25. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1109.
26. Id. at 1088.
27. Id. at 1094.
[Vol. 49:377
THE ROAD LESS WELL TRAVELED
courts to the demands posed by this new class of products liability
cases. One of these responses has been the development of a process
of shutting down the courts to mass tort claimants. That has been
done in the same insidious, not invidious, way that toxic agents cause
their harm, silently and unobserved. Despite the legislative "tort re-
form" movement of the past several decades, it is judge-made law that
has had the deepest impact on this new tort phenomenon. Related,
but much more prominent, aspects of law making that emerge are the
regulation of expert witness testimony and the dramatic shift in the
law regarding the allocation of power between judge and jury.
My focus is the Bendectin litigation and my thesis is that the courts
in the Bendectin litigation were "making law" every bit as much as the
judges who participated in making strict products liability in its first
two decades. A taxonomy of the law making in Bendectin includes
law that was applied internally among the cases that made up the
Bendectin congregation and law that was made and applied externally
to a wide variety of toxic substances (and other) cases. To set forth, at
the outset, my conclusions, the developed internal law might be char-
acterized as: "Bendectin does not cause birth defects as a matter of
law."'28 The external law that emerges consists of a rule that plaintiffs
in toxic substances cases cannot satisfy their burden of production on
causation without statistically significant epidemiological studies and a
paradigm shift from a deference model for courts' treatment of ex-
perts to a very different role, one that envisions the expert as a con-
duit of science. 29
A bit of background is necessary to permit an explanation of these
claims. First marketed in 1956, Bendectin was a combination drug
designed by Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals to treat the morning sick-
ness of pregnant women.30 With four million pregnancies per year in
the United States alone, and millions more worldwide, coupled with
estimates that more than half of pregnant women suffer from morning
sickness,31 the potential market for this drug was quite attractive.
Approved by the FDA before the thalidomide fiasco, Bendectin un-
derwent no reproductive toxicity testing nor any clinical studies to ex-
28. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
29. The work of Ron Allen and Joseph Miller assisted me in appreciating the dramatic change
in the courts' approach to expert witnesses, although Allen and Miller's concern was with the
role of experts for fact finders, not the way in which courts approach experts. See Ronald J.
Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Education?, 87
Nw. U. L. REv. 1131, 1131 (1993).
30. See Judy Folkenberg, Mal de Mere: Simple Remedies Best for Morning Sickness, 22 FDA
CONSUMER 26 (1988).
31. Id. at 28.
1999]
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amine any teratological (birth defects) or other adverse reproductive
effects. At the height of its popularity, Bendectin was consumed by
almost one-third of all pregnant women, 32 and, by the mid-1980s, over
thirty million women had taken the drug worldwide. 33 Yet in the late
1970s when the first lawsuit was brought, there had been one com-
pany-run epidemiological study that was quite poor, so shoddy in fact
that plaintiffs' lawyers scored many favorable points at trial when
cross-examining Merrell's witnesses about it.34 Toxicological studies
by Merrell were quite poorly done, and one generated a "smoking
gun." After thalidomide revealed that drugs could cross the placental
barrier, Merrell began reproductive testing of Bendectin. 35 A Merrell
researcher conducted a teratology study on rabbits and found minor
malformations (shifted ossification centers) in the kits of high-dose
Bendectin rabbits that were similar to the effects previously found in
studies with thalidomide. The researcher warned in his report that
more studies were required to determine whether higher doses of
Bendectin might produce more severe anomalies. 36 Merrell did not
follow up on the researcher's suggestion; it did not submit the report
to the FDA for three years, and when it did, it deleted the sections
about the malformations and the recommendation for further re-
search.37 In short, this episode and others uncovered by plaintiffs'
lawyers assisted plaintiffs in painting Merrell as a company that was at
the very least cavalier about safety, if not malicious about concealing
evidence of teratogenicity in its drug.38 Plaintiffs' lawyers painted this
picture well enough to obtain a number of punitive damage awards
against Merrell, including one for $75 million.39
So when the litigation began in 1977, there was very little evidence
available about Bendectin and the effect that it had (or did not have)
in causing birth defects. Because 3-5% of all live births involve a birth
defect and with one-third of the approximately four million pregnant
women in the United States taking the drug, there were tens of
32. 11 FDA DRUG BULLETIN, INDICATIONS FOR BENDECTIN NARROWED 1 (1981).
33. See generally Robert R. Brent, The Bendectin Saga: Another American Tragedy, 27 TERA-
TOLOGY 283 (1983) (estimating that as of that time 30 million fetuses had been exposed to
Bendectin).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 283-84.
36. Id. at 284.
37. Merrell's explanation for the omission of the malformations was that this was a good-faith
reclassification of data.
38. See MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS
Toxic SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 128-29 (1996); JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A
STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION 8-9 (1998).
39. See Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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thousands of pregnant women each year who had taken Bendectin
and borne children with birth defects. That, of course, does not mean
there is a causal relationship any more than the fact that many people
who die are bald means that baldness causes death.40
With no strong evidence either way, and the damaging evidence of
Merrell's culpability that emerged in discovery, plaintiffs had some
modest success in the first several cases.41 This success spawned a
great deal of publicity, including a front page article in the National
Enquirer,42 much solicitation of additional claimants by the early law-
yers in the litigation, including Melvin Belli, and hundreds of addi-
tional cases.
For our purposes, we can quasi-fast forward the story.43 By the
mid-1980s there were three important developments in the Bendectin
litigation: (1) around 2,000 cases had been filed against the manufac-
turer; (2) plaintiffs were winning almost one-half of the trials that oc-
curred;44 and (3) the scientific evidence on Bendectin's teratogenicity
was becoming robust and tending to exonerate the drug as a
teratogen. 45
What was to be done? Tort reform legislation would not make a
dent in the problem that Bendectin (and similar mass tort) litigation
posed. The most popular tort reform measures, 46 such as imposing
caps on noneconomic damages, modifying joint and several liability,
40. Actually, there is a better case for baldness causing death than Bendectin causing birth
defects based on the incidence of birth defects in the offspring of women who took Bendectin.
Baldness is associated with death in the sense that there is a higher proportion of baldness
among those who die than in the remainder of the population. The number of birth defects after
Bendectin usage does not suggest anything about the comparative incidence of birth defects
among those who did not use Bendectin. Of course, the reason that baldness is associated with
death, even though it is not a cause of it, is that baldness is associated with other attributes, age
and serious diseases, that do cause death. See, e.g., Linda A. Bailey et al., Reference Guide on
Epidemiology, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
121, 158-60 (1994) (discussing confounding relationships).
41. See generally Richard A. Nagareda, Outrageous Fortune and the Criminalization of Mass
Torts, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1121, 1136-37 (1998) (explaining that jurors' moral condemnation of
outrageous conduct by manufacturing defendants has diminished the role of causation in decid-
ing tort cases).
42. New Thalidomide-Type Scandal-Experts Reveal ... COMMON DRUG CAUSING DE-
FORMED BABIES, NAT'L ENQUIRER, Oct. 9, 1979, at 1.
43. For anyone who wants to rewind the tape and play back the story more slowly, there are
several case studies of the Bendectin litigation. See GREEN, supra note 38; SANDERS, supra note
38.
44. See SANDERS, supra note 38, at 119.
45. See Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass
Torts, 43 HAST. L.J. 301, 394-95, 403-06 (1992).
46. See Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races": The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law
Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REV. 207, 217-18 (1990).
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reforming medical malpractice liability, changing the collateral source
rule, limiting contingent attorneys' fees, imposing fee shifting, and re-
stricting punitive damage recovery and awards, would not cut to the
core of the difficulty with the way Bendectin litigation was playing
out.
4 7
The problem was a lack of causation and increasing scientific evi-
dence that causation did not exist, but juries often reached a contrary
conclusion, sometimes spectacularly so. The most notable example of
plaintiff success occurred in Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell Inc.,48 in
which a jury in the District of Columbia awarded Sekou Ealy, an
eight-year-old with severe arm and hand deformities, $20 million in
compensatory damages and $75 million in punitive damages. 49
So long as the plaintiff introduces sufficient evidence, we all know
that causation (like other factual elements of a case) is a question for
the finder of fact.50 Plaintiffs managed to cobble together plausible
theories about why Bendectin was a teratogen, having no trouble find-
ing expert witnesses who would testify in support of it.51 Of course,
Merrell had its experts who testified to the lack of evidence of ter-
atogenicity and the safety of Bendectin.
What to do? The courts might have continued as they had for many
years, merely leaving the question of causation and resolution of the
battle of the experts to the jury.52 This approach is exemplified by the
47. One tort reform that would have made an impact on Bendectin litigation is abrogation of
the Child Savings Acts, which toll the statute of limitations for minors. See John H. Derrick,
Annotation, Tolling of Statute of Limitations, on Account of Minority of Injured Child, as Appli-
cable to Parent's or Guardian's Right of Action Arising Out of Same Injury, 49 A.L.R. 4th 216
(1993). The policy behind these Savings Acts is questionable because parents or guardians, who
may have claims in their own rights, have adequate incentives to make a decision to sue on
behalf of the child. Yet this potential reform never got onto the tort reform movement's radar.
48. 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
49. Id.
50. See McDermott v. Midland Management Inc., 997 F.2d 768, 771 (10th Cir. 1993); Miller v.
American President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450,1463 (6th Cir. 1993); Ingram v. AC & S, Inc., 977
F.2d 1332, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992); Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 427 F.2d 1273,
1275 (3d Cir. 1970); Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Carter, 233 F.2d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 1956); Kurak
v. AP Green, 689 A.2d 757, 765-66 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
51. See SANDERS, supra note 38, at 91-116. As the epidemiological studies of Bendectin grew,
Dr. Alan Done, the primary expert witness for plaintiffs, developed a "mosaic" theory that stipu-
lated that while none of four different types of evidence-epidemiologic, in vitro and in vivo
toxicologic, and chemical structure analysis was sufficient to prove causation, the whole was
greater than the sum of the parts and demonstrated causation. See id. at 106-07; GREEN, supra
note 38, at 277, 283.
52. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1132 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating the
weight of scientific evidence is within the province of the jury); Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 906 F.2d
1299, 1404 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that the court is precluded from "weighing the evidence,
passing on the credibility of the [expert] witnesses, or substituting a court's judgement for that of
the jury"); Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 893 F.2d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating
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District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Ferebee v. Chevron
Chemical Corp.,53 which concluded: "Judges, both trial and appellate,
have no special competence" to review and decide complex scientific
questions of causation. 54 Indeed, in Oxendine v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,55 one of the early Bendectin cases, that is pre-
cisely what the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia did.
Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Alan Done, testified based on structure-activity
information the chemical similarity of Bendectin to known ter-
atogens), in vivo studies (tests on live animals), in vitro studies (tests
on living cells to determine whether a substance affects the cells and
their development), and reanalyses of epidemiological studies (studies
on human beings that compare the incidence of disease in different
groups), that Bendectin caused the plaintiff's shortened right forearm,
missing two fingers on her right hand, and fusion of the three remain-
ing fingers.56 Quoting Ferebee, the court reversed the trial court's
granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict to Merrell, declaring
that "if experts are willing to testify that such a link exists, it is for the
jury to decide whether to credit such testimony. '57
Continuing as before is not what happened. The response of courts
to Bendectin cases beginning in the latter half of the 1980s reveals that
courts actively examined the scientific record on birth defects and
their connection with Bendectin, found succor in prior Bendectin de-
cisions, even though those decisions were based on sufficiency of the
evidence grounds that should have been limited to the evidence in
those cases, critiqued the bases for experts' opinions, declaring them
inadmissible when those bases were found wanting, and created scien-
tific evidentiary thresholds for toxic tort plaintiffs. With hindsight, we
could characterize the courts as having established a rule of law that
plaintiffs cannot prevail on causation in a Bendectin case. This rule is
not the sort of legal rule that we commonly understand courts to be
engaged in making, but judicial lawmaking is. In addition, Bendectin,
with some help from Judge Weinstein in In re "Agent Orange" Prod-
that when expert testimony is in conflict, "the jury alone has the power to weigh that evidence
and assess the credibility of witnesses"); McMahon v. Eli Lilly & Co., 774 F.2d 830, 835 (7th Cir.
1985) (stating that the jury must decide whether to credit experts' testimony on the existence of
causation); Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
53. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1534.
54. Id. at 1534-35.
55. 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1986).
56. Id. at 1104.
57. Id.
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uct Liability Litigation,58 produced two rules that have had a signifi-
cant impact outside the Bendectin litigation.59
Lawmaking by Bendectin courts consisted of two different ap-
proaches with a couple of variations. The first entailed courts that
examined the state of the scientific evidence regarding Bendectin and
birth defects, often in substantial detail. Refusing to defer to the judg-
ment of plaintiff's expert witnesses, who concluded from the evidence
that Bendectin had caused the plaintiff's birth defect, the courts found
the scientific record inadequate to permit such proof, despite an ex-
pert's contrary opinion.
The first such court to employ a sufficiency-of-the-evidence ap-
proach was the trial court in Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,60
after a jury awarded $1.2 million to an infant plaintiff with severe limb
reduction birth defects and her parents.61 Although the court had de-
nied defendant's motion for summary judgment, it granted a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.62 Evidence of Bendectin's
58. 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). The contribution of Judge Jack Weinstein, whose
lawmaking forays are well-known and legendary to the developments described in the text, must
be acknowledged. In the Agent Orange litigation, which occurred in parallel with some of the
early Bendectin cases, Judge Weinstein granted defendants summary judgment in individual suits
brought by veterans who opted out of the class action settlement. Id. In the course of an opin-
ion that discounted the value of animal studies and emphasized the importance of human epide-
miology, Judge Weinstein resurrected Frye and expanded it to address novel opinions, even if
derived from conventional scientific methodologies and principles. Judge Weinstein sounded a
clarion call for careful examination of expert witness testimony in toxic substances cases:
Such careful scrutiny of proposed evidence is especially appropriate in the toxic tort
area. The uncertainty of the evidence in such cases, dependent as it is upon speculative
scientific hypotheses and epidemiological studies, creates a special need for robust
screening of experts and gatekeeping under Rules 403 and 703 by the court.
Id. at 1260. Judge Weinstein's admonition was absorbed and repeated in subsequent Bendectin
cases, such as Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., which remarked on the "growing
realization among academics, lawyers, and judges that cases such as this present special problems
and challenges to traditional ideas regarding the role of the jury as a decision maker." 874 F.2d
307, 309 (5th Cir. 1989). Brock acknowledged that
[u]nder the traditional approach to scientific evidence, courts would not peer beneath
the reasoning of medical experts to question their reasoning. Confronted, as we now
are, with difficult medical questions, courts must critically evaluate the reasoning pro-
cess by which the experts connect data to their conclusions in order for courts to con-
sistently and rationally resolve the disputes before them.
Id. at 309-10. Peter Schuck has admirably chronicled the Agent Orange litigation and Judge
Weinstein's role in lawmaking and outcome determining. See PETER H. SCHUCK, AGrrr OR-
ANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 111-42 (1987); see also Michael D.
Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of the Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Leg-
acy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 643, 675-77 (1992).
59. See infra text accompanying notes 70-75, 109-123.
60. 649 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1986).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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teratogenicity was introduced based on animal studies, in vitro studies,
and chemical structure similarity, but the court focused on the epide-
miological evidence: "The ominous hypothesis of two decades ago,
namely, that Bendectin might be another Thalidomide, has been re-
duced to the status of a perdurable superstition by the worldwide epi-
demiological investigations it provoked .... ,,63
Referring to the published studies introduced by the defendant, the
court concluded that "the literature on Bendectin, individually and in
the aggregate, fails to demonstrate Bendectin's teratogenicity to a sci-
entifically acceptable degree of accuracy." 64 The court added another
important slant to the evaluation of scientific evidence. Dr. Alan
Done and Shanna Swan testified as experts on plaintiffs' behalf based
on their reanalysis of an epidemiological study to account for their
criticism of the methodology employed in the original study. The
court discounted this work because it had not been subjected to the
standard crucible for scientific work-publication and peer review. 65
This failure to publish was adopted by the court of appeals in Richard-
son and later by other courts. And, as we all know, Justice Blackmun
subsequently adopted it in his flexible four factors for evaluating the
scientific methodology of experts in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.66
Another version of this sufficiency-of-the-evidence approach, cham-
pioned by the Fifth Circuit in Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,67 is to require plaintiffs to meet an evidentiary threshold in order
to satisfy their burden of production. Like the Richardson case, a jury
found for the plaintiff, but unlike Richardson, the trial judge had en-
tered judgment for the plaintiff.68 Despite acknowledging the tradi-
tional deference accorded experts, the Brock court expressed the
view, first set forth by Judge Weinstein in Agent Orange, that toxic
substances cases are different.69 A new day of careful scrutiny of sci-
entific evidence had dawned:
Under the traditional approach to scientific evidence, courts would
not peer beneath the reasoning of medical experts to question their
reasoning. Confronted as we now are, with difficult medical ques-
tions, courts must critically evaluate the reasoning process by which
63. Id. at 803.
64. Id. at 802.
65. Id.
66. 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (1993).
67. 874 F.2d 307, 311-13 (5th Cir. 1989).
68. Id. at 313.
69. Id. at 310.
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the experts connect data to their conclusions in order for courts to
consistently and rationally resolve the disputes before them.70
Yet the court did not base its decision on the admissibility of expert
testimony, as had Judge Weinstein. Instead, the court recognized the
primacy of epidemiological evidence as proof of causation and
adopted an evidentiary threshold for plaintiffs. 71 Without a statisti-
cally significant epidemiological study finding Bendectin to be a ter-
atogen, the court declared that the plaintiff could not satisfy her
burden of proof.72 The Fifth Circuit's evidentiary threshold scheme
has the attraction of being simple in application: it requires very little
review or understanding of the scientific record, no analysis of an ex-
pert witness's opinion or its bases, and no consideration of the
strength of the evidence tending to exonerate the alleged toxic agent.
Not only has the Fifth Circuit's approach been employed in subse-
quent Bendectin litigation,73 as well as other toxic agent cases in the
Fifth Circuit,74 it has proven an attractive rationale in a number of
other toxic substances cases, including those in which there was very
little epidemiology that had been conducted examining the agent at
issue.75
The final method, one that culminated with the Supreme Court's
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ,76 entails ex-
amination of the basis of an expert's opinion. The First Circuit, one of
the first to address the matter, reviewed the scientific literature on
birth defects-their known and unknown causes-canvassed the stud-
ies of Bendectin, and critiqued the reanalyses performed by plaintiff's
70. Id. at 309-10 (citation omitted).
71. Id. at 313.
72. Id.; see also Lynch v. Merrell-National Labs., Div. of Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 830 F.2d
1190 (1st Cir. 1987) (rejecting non-epidemiologic evidence as inadequate and thereby implying
an epidemiological threshold). For a critique of the court's reasoning in reaching this conclusion,
see Green, supra note 58, at 667-68.
73. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 575 (S.D. Cal. 1989); Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 724 (Tex. 1997); Oxendine v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., Civ. No. 82-1245, 1996 WL 680992, at *32 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1996).
74. See Bartley v. Euclid, Inc., 158 F.3d 261, 269 (5th Cir. 1998); Thomas v. Hoffman-La-
Roche, 731 F. Supp. 224, 227-28 (N.D. Miss. 1989); Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., CA-
W-88-98 (W.D. Tex. 1990); Kelley v. Am. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 957 F. Supp. 873, 878 (W.D. Tex.
1997) (lower end of confidence interval must be above 1.0-equivalent to requiring that a study
be statistically significant-before a study may be relied upon by an expert).
75. See Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp., 749 F. Supp. 1545, 1555 (Colo. 1990) (quoting Brock
approvingly); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d 183, 198 (Tex. Ct. App.
1998) (requiring reliable epidemiological evidence in order to satisfy burden of producing suffi-
cient evidence on causation); Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1485-86
(D.V.I. 1994).
76. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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experts in Lynch v. Merrell-National Laboratories.77 The court, in a
passage that shakes what edifice Ferebee might represent, concluded:
We face then a situation in which limb reductions are a fairly unu-
sual subspecies of defect, in which the origin of most limb reduction
is unknown, in which world-wide scientific investigations of Bendec-
tin have produced no evidence establishing that Bendectin causes
limb reduction, and in which the irrelevance of Bendectin to the
incidence of limb defects has been demonstrated. The ignorance
that prevails as to the etiology of most birth defects does not mean
causation in a given case could not be proven; it does mean that
there is a large terra incognita where gossip and guess work abound,
so that courts must carefully control the basis for testimony pointing
to a particular cause. A new study coming to a different conclusion
would be admissible evidence. Without such a study there is noth-
ing on which expert opinion on Bendectin as a cause may be based.
The plaintiffs offered no new study.78
Without such scientific evidence, the court declared, the opinions of
the plaintiff's experts were inadmissible because they lacked any legit-
imate basis.79 Once those opinions are found inadmissible, the plain-
tiff is left without any evidence to prove causation, and the trial
judge's grant of summary judgment can be affirmed. The Lynch opin-
ion augured poorly for Bendectin plaintiffs but appeared to have little
direct application for other toxic substances cases given the court's
focus on the scientific record specific to Bendectin.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals continued this expert-
witness-inadmissibility approach one year later on appeal in Richard-
son.80 Eschewing the trial judge's comparative assessment of the
strength of the respective parties' cases, the court of appeals decided,
after conducting a three-page assessment of plaintiff's primary expert
witness and his testimony, that expert testimony contrary to main-
stream scientific thinking and extant epidemiologic evidence is inad-
missible.81 Once again, as with Lynch, the decision appeared to have
its most significant impact within the congregation of Bendectin cases
and did not provide a trans-toxic substances legal rule. 82
The Richardson court distinguished its Ferebee "battles of experts
are for juries" decision by explaining that Ferebee involved a drug,
paraquat, for which there was little scientific evidence about its toxic-
77. 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987).
78. Id. at 1194.
79. Id.
80. See Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
81. Id. at 829-32.
82. That assessment is borne out by a number of subsequent cases in the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals. See infra note 84.
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ity, while Bendectin had become a much-studied drug, with a mature
body of scientific evidence available.8 3 That distinction is persua-
sive-though more relevant to a sufficiency of the evidence analysis-
and reveals the new body of law being developed and applied to
Bendectin cases.84
Richardson was, however, one of the early decisions concluding that
the plaintiff could not prevail. As Joe Sanders has written, the court
was not entirely confident of its analysis of the evidence and sought to
bolster its opinion by explaining that even if plaintiff's expert's testi-
mony were credited, it would not support a finding that Bendectin was
the cause of birth defects. 85
When the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was faced with its
next Bendectin case, Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,86 it confronted
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Despite the jury and trial judge's
view, the court of appeals had no qualms in overturning the judgment.
The court's brief opinion reads like one relying on stare decisis:
We find that this case is squarely within the binding rule articulated
in Richardson: an expert opinion that Bendectin is a human ter-
atogen which caused the plaintiff's birth defects is without scientific
83. Richardson, 857 F.2d at 831-32.
84. That the District of Columbia Circuit meant what it said about the distinction between
Ferebee and Richardson was brought home in a suit brought on behalf of a child born with birth
defects whose mother had taken both Bendectin and Depo-Provera during pregnancy. Am-
brosini v. Labarraque, 966 F.2d 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The case against Merrell was dismissed
based on Richardson. Ambrosini v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., Civ. No. 86-278, 1989 WL 298429,
at *1 (D.D.C. June 30, 1989). Later, the district court also dismissed the case against the manu-
facturer of Depo-Provera after concluding that the plaintiffs' causation experts' testimony was
inadmissible in light of Richardson. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed, con-
cluding that unlike the experts in the Bendectin cases, the plaintiffs' causation experts with re-
gard to Depo-Provera had employed conventional scientific methodology to reach their novel
conclusions, thus employing the methodology/conclusion distinction later adopted by the
Supreme Court in Daubert. Ambrosini, 966 F.2d at 1464. After remand for further inquiry into
the bases of the plaintiffs' experts'opinions, the district court once again concluded the testimony
was inadmissible and entered summary judgment. Ambrosini v. Upjohn Co., Civ. A. No. 84-
3483, 1995 WL 637650, at *8 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 1995). Once again, the court of appeals reversed,
despite expert testimony by a teratologist that was quite similar to Dr. Done's testimony in
Richardson that was found inadmissible. The most persuasive ground that the court of appeals
offered for distinguishing the two cases was that Bendectin "had been the subject of extensive
scientific research ... none of which has concluded that the drug is teratogenic." while "there is
no 'overwhelming body of contradictory epidemiological evidence' to [the expert's] conclusion."
Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 138 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
When a post-Ambrosini Bendectin case was once again before the Court of Appeals, it gave
short shrift to plaintiff's argument that Ambrosini had changed the law established in Richardson
and affirmed the trial judge's conclusion that, because plaintiff's expert'stestimony was inadmis-
sible, judgment as a matter of law for defendant was required. Raynor v. Merrell Pharms. Inc.,
104 F.3d 1371, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
85. See SANDERS, supra note 38, at 163.
86. 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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foundation under Federal Rules of Evidence 703 in the face of a
"wealth of published epidemiological data" to the contrary.... Be-
cause Richardson provides a binding legal precedent governing the
admissibility of expert opinion on the ability of Bendectin to cause
human birth defects, the Ealys can only avoid that decision by
showing that the record here is materially different from that in
Richardson. We find no such difference.
87
In the words of Joe Sanders, Ealy declared that "[a]s a matter of law,
Bendectin does not cause birth defects."
88
One of the more interesting examples of cross-case influence in the
Bendectin litigation occurred in the long saga of Oxendine v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.89 Recall that this is the case in which the
appellate court reinstated a jury verdict. In this, one of the earliest
Bendectin cases, the trial judge granted judgment notwithstanding the
verdict based on the inadequacy of the plaintiff's causation expert.
The court of appeals reversed in an opinion that relied heavily on Fer-
ebee: judges have no special ken in dealing with complex, scientific
issues; if experts have conflicting views, the matter is one to be re-
solved by the jury.90
That might have been the end of it, but it was not. The case devel-
oped into a struggle between the trial court (albeit different judges)
and the appellate court, with the trial court determined to overturn
the jury's verdict and the appellate court equally resolute about up-
holding it. Another decision by the trial court overturned the jury
verdict, this time on a different ground, because the appellate court
had previously ruled the expert's evidence admissible and sufficient. 91
Seizing on mischaracterizations by the expert of his credentials, the
trial court accused the expert of perjury, and found it so egregious that
the verdict had to be overturned.92 Refusing to brook this thinly
veiled attempt to get around its earlier decision, the court of appeals
once again reversed. 93
One might have thought that this second emphatic decision by the
court of appeals would be the end of Oxendine, some seven years after
it was filed. On the contrary, this was the point at which Oxendine
became most interesting for our purposes. Because punitive damages
remained to be resolved, no final judgment could be entered, and
87. Id. at 1160-62.
88. See SANDERS, supra note 38, at 164. See also Lee v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 961 F.2d
1577 (6th Cir. 1992); Elkins v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 996 (M.D. Tenn. 1992).
89. 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1986).
90. Id. at 1110.
91. Id. at 1114.
92. See Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 563 A.2d 330, 331 (D.C. 1989).
93. Id. at 337-38.
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Merrell took the opportunity to argue that developments occurring
after the 1983 trial required that the verdict be reconsidered. 94 After
having been told twice by the court of appeals that the verdict should
not be overturned, the trial court declined. On yet another appeal,
the court of appeals changed its mind. Recognizing the scientific evi-
dence that had developed regarding Bendectin's teratogenicity since
the time of the verdict, the court of appeals permitted the trial court
to reconsider whether to provide Merrell relief from the 1983 ver-
dict.95 While the court of appeals paid obeisance to finality concerns, r
its decision could not have been in more flagrant disregard of them.
Permitting Merrell to challenge a verdict rendered some eleven years
previously based on scientific studies that did not exist at the time,
would, if applied more generally, create never-ending cases forever
subject to reconsideration as science better understood natural
phenomena. 96
The trial court accepted the court of appeals' invitation and wrote
an opinion in 1996, almost two decades after the Bendectin litigation
began, but with a now mature body of scientific evidence. 97 The
court's opinion is more revealing, at least for our purposes, in its struc-
ture than its outcome. While the invitation by the court of appeals
94. Id. at 333.
95. Id. at 337-38.
96. Before a new trial or relief from a judgment on the grounds of newly discovered evidence
may be granted, hornbook law requires that the new evidence concern "facts existing at the time
of trial." 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2808, at 86-87
(2d ed. 1995). Otherwise, judgments would constantly be subject to reconsideration if post-trial
facts could be employed to show that the judgment is erroneous. The Oxendine court reasoned
that although the studies that defendants sought to introduce did not exist at the time of trial,
they concerned a "fact"-whether Bendectin caused birth defects-that existed at the time of
trial. The difficulty with this argument is that it proves too much: new scientific evidence will
always be about a fact that existed and was contested at trial, thereby eliminating this constraint
on consideration of new evidence. Thus, the question must be not whether the fact existed at the
time of trial but whether the evidence did. See Hobbs v. United States, No. 90-1861, 1991 U.S.
A.. LEXIS 27696, at *19 (4th Cir. Nov. 3, 1991) (letter that did not exist at time of trial); Mc-
Cathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 985 P.2d 804, 825 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) ("Thus, the phrase 'newly
discovered evidence' implies that the evidence existed but was not known or knowable at the
time of trial."); see also WRIGHT, supra, § 2859, at 302 ("the same standard applies to motions on
the ground of newly discovered evidence whether they are made under Rule 59 or Rule 60(b)(2)
.... Under both rules, the evidence must have been in existence at the time of the trial .... ); cf.
National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 1 S.W.3d 443 (Ark. 1999) (new research on
connection between chemical and plaintiff's birth defect irrelevant to defendant's res judicata
defense); Strack v. Pelton, 637 N.E.2d 914, 916 (Ohio 1994) (holding that plaintiff could not
challenge paternity judgment with HLA genetic testing that established conclusively that plain-
tiff was not the father and observing: "We are not unaware that our decision in effect declares as
static a state of facts that reliable scientific evidence contradicts.").
97. See Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., Civ. No. 82-1245, 1996 WL 680992, at *2.4
(D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1996).
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was quite limited and tentative-indeed one judge specially concurred
and expressed concern that the remand would prolong a case then
twelve years old, with no change in the outcome-the trial court con-
cluded that newly developed evidence not only would probably pro-
duce a different result in a new trial but that the plaintiff should not
even be afforded the opportunity for a new trial and granted judgment
for Merrell.
The court began its opinion with a survey of other appellate opin-
ions (nine) on the merits in Bendectin cases. The court summarized
its conclusion: "In all of these cases it was the lack of admissible, sta-
tistically significant epidemiological evidence that doomed each plain-
tiff's case." 98 The court proceeded to explain the primacy and
therefore necessity of epidemiological evidence to prove causation,
the necessity not only of epidemiological studies but statistically sig-
nificant ones,99 to summarize each of the epidemiological studies of
Bendectin and birth defects and meta-analyses of these studies that
had been published after the Oxendine jury verdict, to elaborate on
several sources on teratogenic agents and their treatment of Bendec-
tin, and to critique the nine expert affidavits submitted by the plaintiff
before concluding that it must enter "judgment mandated by the state
of scientific knowledge." 1 °
Throughout its critique of plaintiff's expert affidavits, the court re-
lied on other court opinions and their treatment of that expert's testi-
mony. The court employed the analyses and conclusions of several
court-appointed experts in DePyper v. Navarro,1°1 a state court case in
Michigan and the only Bendectin case with court-appointed experts. I
think it is not an inaccurate assessment of Oxendine to say that the
court found its conclusions, methodology, operative rule (statistically
significant epidemiological evidence is required for a plaintiff to pres-
ent a prima facie case), and critical analysis in the prior Bendectin
appellate opinions, none of which, the court took pains to note, fa-
vored a ruling for the plaintiff.102
98. Id. at *7.
99. The demand for statistically significant epidemiological evidence began with the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Brock. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
100. Oxendine, 1996 WL 680992, at *34.
101. No. 83-303467-NM, 1995 WL 788828 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 27, 1995).
102. Oxendine, 1996 WL 680992, at *7 n.16. One might quibble with the court on this point.
In DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the court vacated the trial court's granting of
summary judgment to Merrell, concluding that the trial judge had inadequately explained why
plaintiff's expert testimony was inadmissible. 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3d Cir. 1990). The DeLuca
court expressed its concern that courts were creating "special rules to address the problems
posed by continued Bendectin litigation." Id. at 952. On remand, the trial court held a hearing
on the admissibility of plaintiff's scientific evidence, once again found plaintiff's expert's testi-
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Ten years after Richardson, the Oxendine court exhibited no uncer-
tainty, no doubts that it had reached both a correct and justified deci-
sion. To be sure, the Oxendine court had a considerably more
extensive body of exonerative epidemiological evidence before it, but
the influence on the court of other Bendectin cases, like Richardson,
was substantial. 10 3
These decisions were not, as Joe Sanders has observed, a "series of
isolated, atomistic events.' 10 4 Rather, they are best understood as
part of the "congregation of Bendectin cases," in which courts were,
with their eyes on each other, working out substantive rules to resolve
this significant body of cases.105 "A question to be asked about case
congregations is whether, at some point, courts are prepared to act on
[issues common to all cases] and make substantive determinations in
individual cases based upon knowledge drawn from the congregation
as a whole. With respect to Bendectin, the answer is yes.' 10 6
The move toward resolving Bendectin cases through expert testi-
mony admissibility decisions can be understood as the courts rationing
judicial and court resources. While directed verdicts and judgments
notwithstanding the verdict were devices that could be employed to
correct errors by juries, expert witness rulings had the additional ef-
fect of saving the time of conducting a trial. Once again, Joe Sanders
explains that the courts were, after several lengthy, complicated trials,
seeking devices to limit the resources devoted to resolving Bendectin
cases.10 7 This resource-preservation lawmaking is also revealed by the
failure of courts to recognize the distinction between admissibility and
mony inadmissible, and reentered summary judgment; the Court of Appeals affirmed. DeLuca
v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1042 (D.N.J. 1992).
103. With the judgment for Merrell in Oxendine, there has yet to be a final judgment on
behalf of a plaintiff in the Bendectin litigation, and it is unlikely that there will be. There are
only three live Bendectin cases remaining in the United States. The judgment in Oxendine is on
appeal before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. In another case, Merrell has been
granted summary judgment, but the judgment is not final because of a claim against a co-defend-
ant. The final case has the greatest potential to be resolved against Merrell, but that outcome is
still a long shot. In Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the plaintiffs obtained a jury
verdict of $4.2 million in compensatory damages and $15 million in punitive damages that the
Pennsylvania Superior Court overturned on the ground that the trial court abused its discretion
by admitting plaintiffs' experts' testimony on causation. 705 A.2d 1314, 1323-24 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1998). The court concluded that judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been
granted. Id. at 1324. That decision is currently pending on appeal before the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. See Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 735 A.2d 1267 (Pa. 1999); Telephone
Interview with W. Glenn Forrester, Senior Corporate Counsel for Hoechst Marion Roussel (the
successor to Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) (Aug. 9, 1999).
104. See SANDERS, supra note 38, at 144.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 158.
107. Id.
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sufficiency of the evidence when ruling on the admissibility of expert
testimony. It may be that animal toxicology evidence alone should be
insufficient to support a determination of causation in a toxic sub-
stance case. But, surely, extraordinary circumstances aside, it is rele-
vant to the question of whether a toxic substance causes disease in
human beings. 10 8 Another telling omission in the Bendectin courts'
assessments of plaintiffs' experts and the flaws in their reanalyses is
the frequent jury-deferring device of leaving criticisms and errors to
the "weight to be given the [evidence], rather than bearing on
admissibility." 0 9
The judicial lawmaking that occurred in Bendectin was not limited
to that congregation of cases, however. Initially, it encouraged the
imposition of a higher threshold for sufficient evidence of causation in
108. See Gerald W. Boston, A Mass-Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: The Content of Sci-
entific Proof and the Regulatory Experience, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 181, 230 (1993); Carl F.
Cranor et al., Judicial Boundary Drawing and the Need for Context-Sensitive Science in Toxic
Torts After Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 16 VA. ENrWL. L.J. 1 (1996); Susan
R. Poulter, Reference Guide on Toxicology: Fitting Science to Law, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 169, 176
(1996) ("On balance, because toxicological methods in general have some validity for predicting
the existence and magnitude of human effects, there would seem to be toxic tort cases in which
toxicological evidence ought to be deemed admissible on the issue of general causation."); Ellen
Silbergeld, The Role of Toxicology in Causation: A Scientific Perspecitve, 1 CTs. HEALTH SCI. &
L. 374 (1991).
109. Thus, in Lynch v. Merrell-National Laboratories, Inc., the court held the testimony of
plaintiff's witness, Shanna Swan, inadmissible. 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987). The court began its
criticism of her testimony by observing that the subjects of the study that she reanalyzed were
"an entirely abnormal set-,231 children with birth defects and their mothers." Id. at 1195. In
this criticism, the court failed to appreciate that one well-established epidemiological methodol-
ogy is to conduct a study with those who have the disease of interest and compare their rates of
exposure to suspected agents. See Linda A. Bailey et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE GUIDE ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 121, 136-38 (1994).
Next, the court criticized Swan's work because she compared her cases (those with limb reduc-
tion birth defects) with a control group of only those children with birth defects known to be
caused by genetics. Id. Once again, that reflected a reasonable methodology to exclude those
with birth defects of unknown origin because Bendectin might be a cause of those birth defects,
and, if it were, any associaton between Bendectin and limb reduction defects would be diluted by
birth defects it might cause in the control group. See SANDERS, supra note 38, at 181. Third, the
court criticized Swan for failing to consider whether genetic birth defects might protect against
other birth defects, a little like criticizing a study of the rate of crime for failing to consider the
effect of substituting nonaspirin analgesics such as Tylenol and Advil for aspirin. See id. at 181-
82. Sure, it might, but there is no reason to believe that it does and therefore include that
variable in a study. Finally, the court criticized Swan for failing to publish or have peer reviewed
her reanalysis and concluded that her work therefore could not be the basis of an expert opinion
on the causal relationship between Bendectin and limb reduction defects. Id. at 182-83. The
critical point is not the validity of the court's critique, but its failure to consider that these defi-
ciencies be considered by the jury for its assessment of the strength of Swan's testimony. See
also Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 725-26 (Tex. 1997); cf Kennedy v.
Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1998); Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 140
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (failure of experts to rule out all other possible causes goes to weight and not
admissibility of their opinions); Dipetrillo v. Dow Chemical Co., 729 A.2d 677, 689 (R.I. 1999).
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other toxic substances cases. Ultimately, however, the greatest impact
it spawned was enhanced judicial scrutiny of expert witness testi-
mony-initially to other toxic substances litigation-and ultimately to
the entire panoply of expert witness testimony in products liability
cases.
Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals played a criti-
cal role in this development by instigating the Supreme Court to ad-
dress the question of the appropriate standard by which trial judges
should determine the admissibility of expert witness testimony." 0
This accelerated the influence of Bendectin decisions in other prod-
ucts liability cases, beyond the sufficiency influence of cases like
Brock. Judge Kozinski employed Frye v. United States,"' for the first
time in a Bendectin case in the November of Bendectin litigation." 2
Heavily influenced by the earlier decisions of Lynch, Richardson, and
Brock, Judge Kozinski, in a casual, two-page opinion decided that
plaintiffs' expert witnesses' reanalyses of other studies could not sup-
port their opinions because they had not been subjected to peer re-
view or published, both of which were required to satisfy generally
accepted scientific methodology under Frye. n3
The invocation of Frye in a Bendectin case and the potential for a
legal methodology for the review of expert witnesses had profound
implications beyond Bendectin. Confronted with the narrow, yet im-
portant question of whether Frye survived the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the Supreme Court replaced Frye with a focus on
reliability and fit, and a list of four factors for trial judges to employ.
To say that the Supreme Court replaced Frye in its Daubert opinion
is misleading. What the Court did in Daubert was to adopt a test for
scrutinizing an expert's methodology and reasoning that filled a previ-
ously extant void. Frye and its general acceptance test was virtually
nonexistent in civil cases and toxic substances litigation until Judge
110. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
111. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
112. Frye had earlier been cited, but not employed, by Judge Higginbotham in his dissent to
the denial of rehearing en banc in Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 884 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir. 1989). Judge Higginbotham cited Frye in support of the proposition that the issue of
whether courts "should accept opinions of experts not based upon a generally accepted scientific
principle and the more broadly stated concern that substantive principles such as tort law are not
handling science issues in a rational manner" "has, of course, been debated in varying intensity
since the 1923 decision" in Frye. Id. at 168-69, 169 n.2. Frye was also cited in Deluca v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 955 (3d Cir. 1991), but only by way of explaining that
an earlier criminal case had rejected use of it, because of its problematical aspects.
113. Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1129-31. See also Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 F.2d 307,
312-13 (5th Cir. 1989); Lynch, 830 F.2d at 1193-96; Richardson, 857 F.2d at 831; Frye, 293 F. at
1013.
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Kozinski employed it in Daubert.114 Prior to the revolution wrought
by the Bendectin litigation, expert testimony in products liability cases
simply was not judicially screened.
Suffice to say that Daubert made a sea change in the law of expert
witnesses, and this new law has had a profound impact on products
liability law. Expert witnesses testifying about alternative designs, 115
the causes of accidents, 116 the adequacy of warnings, 117 and the exist-
ence of defects," 8 have been subjected to the "gatekeeping" man-
dated by Daubert, with their opinions frequently found inadmissible.
Those of us who thought Daubert would produce more of the laissez-
114. Professor Paul Gianelli reports: "The civil cases, spurred by toxic tort litigation, also
came later. Frye had been applied almost exclusively to criminal cases and was not applied in a
federal civil case until 1984." Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1999, 2008 (1994) (citations omitted). See also MICHAEL H. GRA-
HAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 703.2 (3d ed. 1991) ("The Frye test has been applied
most frequently over the years in criminal cases .... ); 1 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER
B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 105, at 853 (1977) ("The Frye standard ... is rarely applied
in civil litigation; Frye itself has been cited only in a very few civil cases, principally in state
courts in connection with blood tests to determine paternity."); FAUST F. Rossi, EXPERT WIT-
NESSES 36 (1991) (The Frye standard traditionally has been applied almost exclusively in criminal
cases.").
A Westlaw search for all non-criminal cases that cited Frye and were decided before 1990
produced 25 cases. Of those 25 cases, eight were habeas corpus cases, seven employed the nar-
row holding of Frye to decide that lie detector evidence is inadmissible, four cases cited to Frye
generally without employing it as a precedent in the case, and five cases employed Frye to deal
with traditional criminal forensic evidence (e.g., fingerprinting) whose admissibility was at issue
in a civil case. The only one of these 24 cases that was a toxic substances case was Brock, in
which Judge Higginbotham cited Frye in his dissent to the denial of rehearing en banc. See supra
note 112. The final case, Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., cited Frye critically and concluded
that the dispute over the validity of the methodology in certain epidemiological studies should
be submitted to the jury, rather than be decided by the judge. 745 F.2d 292, 303-04 (4th Cir.
1984).
Indeed, on one view of Frye it was inapplicable to the conventional scientific methodologies
employed in cases like Daubert. Frye was understood to be limited to novel scientific tech-
niques. See Cuevas v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 956 F. Supp. 1306,1308 (S.D. Miss. 1997).
Daubert made plain that the gatekeeping obligation it imposed included all scientific expert wit-
nesses regardless of how conventional their scientific tools may be. See 509 U.S. 579, 592 n.ll
(1993) ("Although the Frye decision itself focused exclusively on 'novel' scientific techniques, we
do not read the requirements of Rule 702 to apply specially or exclusively to unconventional
evidence.").
115. See, e.g., Pries v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 31 F.3d 543, 545 (7th Cir. 1994);
Stanczyk v. Black & Decker, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 565, 567-68 (N.D. I11. 1993) (excluding expert
opinions under the Daubert approach in design defect cases).
116. See, e.g., Vadala v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 44 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 1995); McCullock v. H.B.
Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1043-45 (2d Cir. 1995); Roback v. V.I.P. Trans. Inc., No. 91 C 5902, 1994
WL 548197 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 1994) (finding experts' opinions regarding causation inadmissible
under Daubert); Golod v. LaRoche, 964 F. Supp. 841, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
117. See, e.g., Robertson v. Norton Co., 148 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 1998).
118. Jaurequi v. John Deere Co., 173 F.3d 1076, 1084 (8th Cir. 1999); Diviero v. Uniroyal
Goodrich Tire Co., 114 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 1997).
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faire status quo have been proved desperately wrong, as courts have
aggressively examined proposed expert testimony and ruled it inad-
missible without hesitation. 119
The Supreme Court's decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichae 20
confirms this revolution in products liability law and extends the law-
making begun in the Bendectin litigation beyond toxic substances liti-
gation to the full range of products liability cases. The Kumho
decision makes plain that the Daubert framework is applicable not
only to the epidemiologists and toxicologists who testify about causa-
tion in toxic substances cases, but also to the accident reconstruction
experts, human factors experts, engineering experts from all disci-
plines, and physicians who provide essential evidence in virtually
every products liability case.' 2'
And let us not underestimate the impact of this development. Ex-
tending Daubert to virtually all experts who testify in products liability
cases will increase the costs of litigating a products case in both obvi-
ous and nonobvious ways,122 provide additional strategic opportuni-
119. I have a weekly Lexis Eclipse search that provides me with all reported federal cases in
which Daubert is invoked to challenge the admissibility of an expert's testimony. I generally see
10-12 cases per week, of which 2/3 are civil, and the vast majority of which hold the challenged
expert's testimony inadmissible. While this is surely not a representative sample of Daubert
matters, it does reflect at least a portion of the federal judiciary in active examination of expert
testimony. See also Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REv. 699, 732 (1998)
("Many of the reported cases on scientific experts after Daubert have resulted in exclusion of the
proffered testimony.").
120. 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).
121. Id. at 1174-75.
122. The obvious way in which Daubert and Kumho will increase the costs of litigation is
through the pretrial motions and hearings to determine the admissibility of a challenged expert's
testimony. Cf. United States v. Katz, 178 F.3d 368, 370 (5th Cir. 1999). ("We would be remiss if
we did not note that we are troubled by the amount of judicial resources that were devoted to
the Daubert hearing. In a case capable of being tried start to finish in a day and one half, not
only the court but the lawyers were engaged for the better part of five days in a hearing to
determine the reliability of testimony and potential prejudice of exhibits involving a well known
test that is applied in a quite straightforward manner. Daubert hearings in cases much more
complex than this one are customarily conducted with dispatch consuming only a few hours at
best.") The latent impact of these cases on costs occurs for additional reasons. First, experts will
be required to spend more time specifying the bases of their opinions so as to permit an assess-
ment of the validity of their methodology. See Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412, 416-
17 (3d Cir. 1999) (reversing trial judge who held expert's opinion inadmissible because the report
contained only "conclusory statements" and remanding for a hearing pursuant to Federal Rules
of Evidence 104(a), at which the expert's reasoning could be fully presented). Second, the de-
mands of scrutinizing expert testimony will push forward the time when experts will have to
perform and complete their work. Frequently, lawyers, especially plaintiffs' lawyers, attempt to
defer expert efforts and their associated costs until late in the pretrial process, so as to avoid
paying for them unnecessarily in the event that a case settles. Third, scrutiny of an expert's
methodology and reasoning will frequently require that experts spend more time, effort, and
resources in conducting their investigation and preparing their reports than previously. See Wat-
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ties for expert discovery, and have a significant impact on which cases
are brought and how they are resolved.
Another area in which judicial lawmaking is now emerging, spurred
by the developments in Bendectin and Daubert is in the silicone gel
breast implant cases. This lawmaking may ultimately lead to decisions
that bar plaintiff's expert witnesses from testifying, thereby rendering
the plaintiffs unable to prove causation. But the breast implant litiga-
tion has not quite reached the end-stage that Bendectin has been
through.
The lawmaking in the breast implant cases entails the appointment
of court-appointed experts to assist in resolving Daubert challenges to
the admissibility of plaintiffs' experts' testimony. To date, panels con-
sisting of experts in several relevant sciences were appointed by Judge
Jones in Hall v. Baxter Corp.,123 which consisted of seventy consoli-
dated cases in federal court in Oregon, and by Judge Sam Pointer in
the multidistrict breast implant consolidated pretrial proceedings in
Alabama. 124 The frequency with which court-appointed experts have
been recommended by commentators in the past has been exceeded
only by the frequency with which the advice is ignored. 25 In ap-
kins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 992 (5th Cir. 1997) (expert proposing alternative design for
holding conveyer arm must do more "than just conceptualizing possibilities"). The district court
appropriately noted the lack of testing of any of the proposed alternatives. See also Cummins v.
Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 368 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasizing the importance of testing of alternative
designs as prerequisite to the admissibility of an expert's opinion, easing off a bit as to whether it
is always required and observing "Rule 702 is designed to ensure that, when expert witnesses
testify in court, they adhere to the same standards of intellectual rigor that are demanded in their
professional work."); Byrnes v. Honda Motor Co., 881 F. Supp. 279, 281 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (ruling
plaintiff's expert's testimony about an alternative design for a motorcycle to provide lower body
crash protection inadmissible because alternative design had not been built, tested, or accepted
by the industry); McCollin v. Synthes Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1127 (D. Utah 1999) ("It is clear
that no expert orthopedic surgeon would attempt to make a diagnosis without examining the
patient, without considering the entirety of a patient's records, by allowing a non-doctor to select
records before she considered them, or by allowing non-medical personnel to conduct patient
interviews used for diagnostic purposes"); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIA-
BILITY § 2 cmt. e (1998):
In many cases, the plaintiff must rely on expert testimony. Subsection 2(b) does not,
however, require the plaintiff actually to produce a prototype in order to make out a
prima facie case. Thus, qualified expert testimony on the issue suffices, even though the
expert has produced no prototype.
Id. Daubert and Kumho were not crafted to foster economical litigation.
123. 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1415 (D. Or. 1996).
124. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 996 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
For a listing of the specific orders related to the appointment of and charge to the panel of
experts, see Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO. L.J.
1983, 1983 n.2 (1999).
125. See Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation: Defining a Role
for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1004 (1994); E.
Donald Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three Approaches for Regulating Scientific
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pointing expert panels126 to consider the evidence of silicone gel
breast implants' causal connection with immune system disease, these
courts are breaking new ground in finding ways to assist in the resolu-
tion of mass toxic substances cases.127
I do not consider the conclusion I have reached to the question
posed to be surprising or provocative. Courts have been "making
law" in response to changes in the social, political, economic, and sci-
entific landscape for centuries and will, no doubt, continue to do so.
Tort law, as the American Bar Association explained in its thorough
review of the subject, "provides an important front-line weapon for
the law" as courts "confront novelty and change: new products,
processes and techniques, and changing conceptions of justice in a so-
ciety whose ideas of justice continue to evolve"'128 orwaver over time.
Mass toxic substances litigation has, since the mid-1970s, presented
courts with a panoply of challenges to traditional products liability law
that has required rethinking of many well-accepted principles, includ-
ing the respective role of judge and jury, acceptable proof of causa-
tion, and a host of other issues of substantive and procedural law.129
Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487, 501 (1989); Sameul R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REV.
1113, 1191 (study of over 500 civil trials in the California in which of 1,748 expert witnesses who
testified, none was court appointed); Tahirih V. Lee, Court-Appointed Experts and Judicial Re-
luctance: A Proposal to Amend Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 480, 494-95 (1988) ("Even with Rule 706 in place, judges rarely appoint experts."). See also
Michael Saks, Court-Appointed Experts: Defining the Role of Experts Appointed Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 706, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 233, 234 (1995) (Rule 706 "is a rule that was never
really intended to be used. And not using it is what most judges do with it most of the time").
126. Judge Jones' experts were for the purpose of assisting him in resolving the motions to
exclude expert testimony, rather than to testify in the case. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947
F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996). The expert panel in the Multidistrict Litigation was appointed to
provide expert testimony for the federal courts to which the multidistrict cases are remanded
upon completion of the multidistrict proceedings. The Order establishing the panel did not spec-
ify to what use these experts would be put, presumably leaving that to the judgment of the
remand court. Order No. 31, May 31, 1996, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab.
Litig., 996 F. Supp. at 1112.
127. See Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming
1999).
128. See SPECIAL COMMIITEE ON THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE
OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN
TORT LAW 11-12 (1984).
129. Other areas in which the courts have engaged in lawmaking include: (1) reconsidering
the role of class actions for mass torts, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999);
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97
F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996); (2) substantially modifying of the single judgment rule, Jackson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986); (3) determining which of several al-
leged "injuries" are legally cognizable (asymptomatic pleural plaque, medical monitoring),
Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986) (enhanced risk); Potter v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993); In re Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp. 634 (D. Me. 1986)
(cancerophobia); (4) using sampling techniques to determine individual personal injury dam-
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That judges made and continue to make law in these new cases which
pose difficult scientific issues and large numbers of claimants with dif-
ferent types of injuries is no surprise. That new law has emerged is
unsurprising. That dispositive new law has developed in the Bendec-
tin litigation in the shadowy underworld of admissibility and suffi-
ciency of evidence areas may be less well appreciated, but it is no less
real in its impact on the outcomes of these cases.
I would like to conclude by confessing that I have avoided the most
difficult issue implicated in my assignment. I have hewed to the de-
scriptive and ignored the normative. Is the lawmaking that I have de-
scribed the much-castigated "judicial activism" that my colleague
Arthur Bonfield so well defined, or is this the genius of the common
law process, making the necessary adjustments that social, technologi-
cal, and political winds require? 130 Answering that is an endeavor
more difficult, I think, than learning riverboat piloting on the Missis-
sippi. Without a figurative Mr. Bixby 131 to guide me on this journey, I
shall leave it to others to answer this question.
ages, Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd, 151 F.3d 297
(5th Cir. 1998); (5) deciding whether to adopt a market-share basis of liability, compare Smith v.
Eli Lilly, 560 N.E.2d 324 (I11. 1990), with Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.
1989); (6) making efforts to impose limits on the repetitive punitive damage awards for the same
conduct, Dunn v. HOVIC, I F.3d 1362 (3d Cir. 1993); Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F.
Supp. 1053 (D.N.J. 1989); (7) polyfurcating trials to separate out the general causation issue or
other issues for distinct consideration, In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988).
130. Compare KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS (1997), and David E. Bernstein, Junk Science in the
United States and the Commonwealth, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 123 (1996), with Lucinda Finley,
Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening
Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335 (1999); Michael H. Gottesman,
From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or Double Error?, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 753 (1998);
Anthony Z. Roisman, Conflict Resolution in the Courts: The Role of Science, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1945 (1994).
131. Mr. Bixby was the riverboat captain who taught Twain how to pilot a steamboat.
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